Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)

LOGCAP Support Unit (LSU) Det.Y8 - Iraq

After Action Report &

Lessons Learned

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

The After Action Report (AAR) comments enclosed are comments provided and collected from the LOGCAP Support Unit (LSU) - Iraq, W8G8Y8 redeploying personnel, Defense Contract Management Agency representatives, the Multi-National Forces - Iraq during our tenure in Iraq from June 2004 through June 2005.

Listing Of After Action Report Topics

I.  ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, RELATIONSHIPS

A.     LOGCAP Teamwork

B.     Support in General from KBR

C.     Politics Involved with Various Customers

D.     Roles, Responsibilities, Relationships

E.      The LOGCAP Planner should be part of the MSC G4 Staff

F.      Appoint an OIC for TEAM LOGCAP

II. TRAINING AND DOCTRINE

A.     Key Ingredients to the Success of a LOGCAP Team

B.     Properly Educating the Customer on the Mission and Capabilities of LOGCAP

C.     What does the LOGCAP planner need in to know in order to provide adequate support to his customers or to be an effective LOGCAP planner?

D.     LOGCAP Knowledge and Expectations

E.      Training and Educating – of the Customer(s)

F.      Training and Doctrine

G.     ACOs not Knowledgeable in LOGCAP

H.     The Concept of LOGCAP is not getting to the Higher Levels

III. MOBILIZATION AND UTILIZATION

1. LSU Mobilization and Rotation
2. Mobilization of the LSU Reserve Unit
3. No Personnel Replacement System in Place
4. LSU Relying on Cross Leveled Soldiers
5. No Administration Staff while on Deployment

IV. OPERATIONS

1. Weekly Progress Reviews for LOGCAP Projects
2. Provide Updates of the Statement of Work to all Team Members Throughout the Development Process
3. Supporting Civilians and Contractors
4. Too Many Repetitive SITREPS

V. CONTRACT/CONTRACTOR

A.     Contractor Support and LSU Equipment

B.     Contractor Performance Measures and Boards

C.     Contract / Contractor

D.     Contract / Contractor

E.      KBR SITREPS are not Informative

F.      No Coordination with Military Units that Desire that their Subcontractors be on LOGCAP Support before they showed up in Theater

G.     Potential LOGCAP Support to ISF, ING, and U.S. Advisor Teams

H.     Certain People need to be Investigated Further for Possible Criminal Activity

I.  ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, RELATIONSHIPS

A.

SHORT TITLE: LOGCAP TEAMWORK

ISSUE: LOGCAP TEAMWORK

DISCUSSION: During this tour the LOGCAP Detachment Headquarters at Camp Victory did not sponsor a training/ team building event for all of the planners due to travel restrictions, tactical situations, and R&R schedules.   DCMA does this on a regular basis because they are all on short tours.  They have all their Aces, Wars, and Property Techs get together for a weekend of training, discussion, operational updates and team building. 

RECOMMENDATION: Future detachments should attempt to plan some type of Unit Activity.  This would go along way towards building some type of unit cohesion.  Current structure is not really conducive to teamwork.   Communication from the LOGCAP Detachment Headquarters at Camp Victory is very poor.  “I heard from so and so” is not effective communications.  Recommend the Detachment Commander be more visible to the field.  

I.  ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, RELATIONSHIPS

B.

SHORT TITLE:  SUPPORT FROM KBR

ISSUE: UNDERSTANDING THE REQUIREMENT FOR KBR TO SUPPORT TEAM LOGCAP.

DISCUSSION: DCMA is not fully aware of KBR’s requirement to support the planner. Just recently the ACO at Camp Echo actually read the SOP and SOW, and identified the shortcomings by KBR. He immediately issued an ACL directing KBR to rectify the problems.  As of this date KBR has not corrected anything.  This is an education issue for one.  It is also the failure of AMC to actually equip the LSU.  If I was a contractor, and I was supporting a unit fielded by Army Material Command, I would probably do the same.  My impression would be, “how important is the LOGCAP unit?”, when their own command will not support them.  I have seen some extravagant JARB decisions for what would be classified as a luxury, yet LOGCAP cannot even provide a laptop or a printer.  I have purchased just about all of my administrative needs such as pens, paper etc, or obtained from customer units.  Think of how that looks to the customer unit? 

RECOMMENDATIONS: Provide better training to DCMA prior to deployment.

I.  ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, RELATIONSHIPS

C.

SHORT TITLE:  POLITICS INVOLVED WITH VARIOUS CUSTOMERS

ISSUE:  LOGCAP PERSONNEL SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE POLITICS INVOLVED WITH VARIOUS CUSTOMERS

DISCUSSION: Military and civilian customers of LOGCAP task orders are often working in a political environment, related to funding and also expectations.  Some LOGCAP task orders support non-DOD customers, and continuously more task orders are supporting larger numbers of civilians.  It is not the norm for civilians to expect the service levels that are typical for a military unit and its members.  Determining how to manage varying service levels is a task that must be learned over time and through working with the primary and other LOGCAP paying customers. 

RECOMMENDATON:  Consideration and awareness of the political environment must be evaluated in many LOGCAP situations.  Knowing who to ask, how to get a recommendation and the sources for information must be a part of LOGCAP processes in the political environments.

I.  ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, RELATIONSHIPS

D.

SHORT TITLE:  ROLES, RESPONSIBILITES, RELATIONSHIPS

ISSUE:  EVERYONE NEEDS TO WORK TOGETHER AS A TEAM

DISCUSSION:  ACOs need to accept the fact that LOGCAP is the parent agency.  Some ACOs want to act as if the LOGCAP Planner is their staff.  Others do not utilize the LOGCAP Planner at all.  Most ACOs fail to use a very valuable asset in the Planner.  Some ACOs have opted to ask KBR’s PM for advice instead of the Planner.  Finally my fourth ACO underneath this same task order, asked me to vet all requests for LOTDs and ACLs for him.  Being a team player, I was glad to assist in any fashion.     

RECOMMENDATION:  ACOs need to given a class on LOGCAP.  They need to be taught that we are here as additional government oversight.  They need to be taught that the only distinction between us is their warrant.  The LOGCAP Planner’s title should be changed to LOGCAP LNO.

I.  ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, RELATIONSHIPS

E.

SHORT TITLE:  THE LOGCAP PLANNER SHOULD BE PART OF THE MSC G4 STAFF.

ISSUE:  EVERY MSC SHOULD HAVE THEIR OWN LOGCAP PLANNER ON THE G4 STAFF, SO THAT THEY CAN CAPTURE REQUIREMENTS PRIOR TO DEPLOYING TO THE THEATER.

DISCUSSION:  Every unit below the MSC wanted their own LOGCCAP planner.  The ASG commander at Al Asad kept insisting that they needed their own dedicated LOGCAP planner.  They were told that they work for the MEF and to work with the LOGCAP planner assigned to the MEF.  This is the reason that LOGCAP needs to be taught at OBC, OAC, and CGSC levels so that each unit can grow their own LOGCAP planner.  Also, by having the LOGCCAP Planner as part of the G4 staff, there would be better support when it comes to force protection and getting around in theater. 

RECOMMENDATION:  This should be implemented and the LOGCAP Support Unit would not be needed in the future. 

I.  ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, RELATIONSHIPS

F.

SHORT TITLE:  APPOINT AN OIC FOR TEAM LOGCAP

ISSUE: THERE IS NOT ONE OIC THAT COMMANDS TEAM LOGCAP

DISCUSSION:  There should be an overall OIC at the 0-6 level for Team LOGCAP. There were too many conflicts with all 4 agencies.  You have people with too much knowledge or rank straying into each others’ lanes of responsibilities.  Everybody, to include the civilians, think they are the ones who run the show.  Within the LSU cell, should PM LOGCAP fall under the LSU Detachment OIC?  AMC Deputy Cdr, LTG Hack asked this question when he was visiting Iraq in 2004 and was confused as to why this was not done.  Should it be set up just like the AMC Field Support Brigade in Balad?  There you have a GS-14 as the Deputy Commander.  Last year, somebody at AFSC tried to draft a FRAGO where the PM LOGCAP forward representative was going to be the one that ran all of Team LOGCAP.  This did not get far and was squashed.  The current question now is where does the PCO forward fall in the chain of command of Team LOGCAP?  Does this person issue orders to the LSU? 

RECOMMENDATION:  A military officer in the rank of 05 or 06 needs to be appointed  to be overall in charge of Team LOGCAP.  Do not place senior grade civilians (GS13 and higher) here because it causes flare ups when they think that you work for them and they try to pull rank. 

II. TRAINING AND DOCTRINE

A.

SHORT TITLE:  KEY INGREDIENTS TO THE SUCCESS OF A LOGCAP TEAM

ISSUE:  THERE WERE MIXED RESULTS THROUGHOUT THE THEATER ON THE SUCCESS OF WORKING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN LOGCAP PLANNERS AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING OFFICERS

DISCUSSION:  Throughout the theater there were mixed results on the success of working relationships on Team LOGCAP.  In order to succeed in this fast paced, highly stressful environment it is imperative that the LOGCAP Planner and ACO develop a close relationship that fosters success and presents one face to the customer.  The following guidelines are offered:

- The relationship between the LOGCAP Planner and ACO is “rank less”.  Rank should be put aside and a relationship of partnering should take affect.  Neither member should attempt to “boss” the other, the LOGCAP Planner and ACO need to become true partners in their efforts of supporting the customer and leading the LOGCAP Team.

- If at all possible the LOGCAP Planner and ACO should have their work spaces co-located.  This allows for much better coordination of efforts and further presents one face to the customer.

- Conduct all business with the customer together.  Whether you are conducting a meeting, visiting a site or hosting visitors to your camp, work together as a team in all endeavors.

RECOMMENDATION:  As soon as possible establish a close, working relationship with your ACO.  Co-locate your work areas, conduct all meetings with the customer together and always present one face to the military.

II. TRAINING AND DOCTRINE

B.

SHORT TITLE:  PROPERLY EDUCATING THE CUSTOMER ON THE MISSION AND CAPABILITIES OF LOGCAP

ISSUE:  THERE WERE TIMES WHEN THE CUSTOMER HAD UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS OF THE SPEED THAT SERVICES COULD BE PUT IN PLACE, THE COST OF SERVICES AND THE QUALITY OF SERVICES. 

DISCUSSION:  There were occasions when in the course of executing LOGCAP services that the customer had unrealistic expectations of the program.  The phrase was often heard, “We want it fast and cheap.”  The LOGCAP program is an outstanding service that can be used to support the force in the field and when planned and executed properly is a combat force multiplier. 

RECOMMENDATION:  The LOGCAP Planner and ACO should team together early on to provide a mission brief to their customers outlining the mission and capabilities of LOGCAP.  It is imperative that Team LOGCAP manage expectations with the customer and continually provide updates on projects and services that are being provided.

II. TRAINING AND DOCTRINE

C.

SHORT TITLE: WHAT DOES THE LOGCAP PLANNER NEED TO KNOW IN ORDER TO PROVICE ADEQUATE SUPPORT TO HIS CUSTOMERS OR TO BE AN EFFECTIVE LOGCAP PLANNER?

ISSUE:  IF THE PLANNER DOES NOT UNDERSTAND LOGCAP HE OR SHE CANNOT HELP HIS CUSTOMERS GET SUPPORT, AND THE CUSTOMERS LOSES RESPECT FOR THE PLANNERS AND RELY TOO HEAVILY ON THE ACO FOR EVERYTHING.

DISCUSSION: I had some camps where the customers did not know what services were provided by LOGCAP.  Some of the results of unknowledgeable customers are as follows:

1)      I had some customers that were rigging up generators to get electricity in some of the bombed out buildings they were living in.  Soldiers were getting shocked because of faulty wiring.

2)      Some soldier were living in tents while other were living in trailers because they did not know how to do a SOW and IGCE for trailers.

3)      Some customers did not have enough abution units in accordance with the sand book standards because they did not know the process for getting KBR services turned on.

4)      I had camps were the customer did not know how to get a generator or ablution unit turned on for O&M support to KBR.  The results were many TOC’s, office buildings, and trailers purchased by the customer were not receiving O&M support.

5)      BN CDR, BN XO, S-4, G-4, etc. screaming and yelling why can Victory get this and we cannot.  How can I send Soldiers out to fight everyday and they come back to these living conditions.

6)      Customers are trying to plan for support for surge but do not know how to get tents and generators turned over to KBR.  The result is that units get the tents through contingency contracting but fail to get O&M support and the Soldiers live in a cold tent, poor lighting with generator going out constantly.

RECOMMENDATION: I would recommend the following: Know the SOW and know the process for getting work turned on by KBR.  One example is when a customer asks you how we can get KBR to fix my lights or my Soldiers are getting shocked and I do not know what to do to get this fixed.  You need to have KBR turned on for electrical O&M on your building.  Electrical O&M on the building means that they will replace the lights, do repairs on the electrical outlets, repair the electrical wiring, etc.  I need you to do an LOTD request to the ACO and ensure that you Site Mayor, S-4, and/or G4 support you in getting support for this building.

1)      Know how to get generators, HVAC units, and buildings turned over to KBR property books.

2)      Know the Basis of Estimate (BOE).  Customer says that I believe that KBR was providing support to this building but now they have stopped.  Reply:  I have looked at the BOE and that is one of the buildings listed on the BOE so I will have the Area Manager and the ACO ensure that KBR starts performing O&M on the building.

3)      Know how to do an IGCE, know what language needs to be in the SOW for getting additional LOGCAP requirements approved by the JARB board, know the process for getting a JARB packet approved. 

4)      Example the BN CDR, G4, or Camp Mayor says to you I have 1000 additional Soldiers that will be living in my camp in the next 6 months and I need additional trailers and ablution units to support them.  What do I do?  First ensure they have gotten C4 or G4 approval.  Second make sure that the camp is scheduled to be there for at least another year to 18 months.  Third show the customer how to write a SOW for the additional personnel coming to the camp and do the IGCE for them at the same time.  Explain to them what Generator O&M, power generation, water works, DFAC support, facility management, ablution units, latrines, port-a-potties, and waste management mean.  He needs to know that these things need to be added to support his request for supporting the additional Soldiers.

5)      Get involved and ensure that the customers know you care and that you will help them.

II. TRAINING AND DOCTRINE

D.

SHORT TITLE: LOGCAP KNOWLEDGE AND EXPECTIONS

ISSUES:  LOGCAP KNOWLEDGE AND EXPECTATIONS

DISCUSSION: Thus far the education process has not been successful.  DCMA, KBR management, and customer units are reading the LOGCAP SOP for the first time.   A salesman approach is being used by the LSU, this is not correct. It is a commander’s option to choose LOGCAP. Expectations are fueled by misinformation. 

RECOMMENDATION:  Re-evaluate the current education program, and refine LOGCAP intent and priority of use.

II. TRAINING AND DOCTRINE

E.

SHORT TITLE:  TRAINING AND EDUCATING – OF THE CUSTOMER(S)

ISSUE: TRAINING AND EDUCATING – OF THE CUSTOMER(S)

DISCUSSION: It has been learned many times over, that customers of LOGCAP need to be reminded and educated of the LOGCAP principles and processes.  The limitations and the capabilities must be communicated over and over, to individuals of an organization, and to each different organization as well.  A methodology for explaining, educating and responding to questions is useful for efficiency.  Examples that pertain to the customer are beneficial as well.  Having access to several such documents / tools / examples is worthwhile and they should be maintained.  While each task order is unique, there are some common education points and then some specific to the task order (environment) as well.  Various customers attempt to meet various “requirements” by fitting their requirement into the task order(s) – in some cases that works, in others it won’t work.  For some task orders, the LOGCAP customer is challenged to identify and accept “guest” customers in the current operating environment – people who need support sometimes “just show up” and expect to be supported.

RECOMMENDATON:  A methodology and template for explaining, educating and responding to questions is useful, for efficiency and the anticipation of ongoing questions.  Keep examples that pertain to the customer, and are beneficial for several types of customers as well. 

II. TRAINING AND DOCTRINE

F.

SHORT TITLE:  TRAINING AND DOCTRINE

ISSUE:  OUR TRAINING NEEDS TO BE MORE SPECIFIC; THE ARMY NEEDS TO BE TAUGHT ABOUT LOGCAP

DISCUSSION:  The training that a LOGCAP Planner undergoes needs to be more specific.  We spend too much time on generic Army skills, and not enough on LOGCAP specific training. 

RECOMMENDATION:  We need to develop a LOGCAP Acronym & Abbreviation Guide.  Our training should incorporate actual SITREPs and Trip Reports from the past.  We need to be tutored on constructing IGCEs, and the writing of Scopes of Work.  The LOGCAP Triangle should be taught to all Planners for use in the field.  More classes needed to be geared towards KBR’s organizational chart, and functions of their respective departments.  LOGCAP familiarization needs to be implemented in CAS3 and CGSC.         

II. TRAINING AND DOCTRINE

G.

SHORT TITLE:  ACOs NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE IN LOGCAP

ISSUE:  NOT ALL ACOs WERE KNOWLEDGEABLE ON LOGCAP OPERATIONS. THEY WERE LEARNING AS THEY WERE GOING.

DISCUSSION:  ACOs were not trained in LOGCAP – look at their AARs.  An example is when the DCMA Commander for Iraq was saying that LOGCAP Planners should be doing Technical Support to Negotiations (TSN) for a Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. (KBR) proposal because his ACOs were not trained in it.  We had to tell him that LOGCAP Planners had no experience in this as well because we did not have an acquisition background. A quote from COL John Miles, DCMA Commander, Iraq, “many of the ACOs I am getting are so inexperienced that they will struggle with typical ACOs duties much less a TSN.”   

RECOMMENDATION:     LSU should take a more proactive approach and train more ACOs during the year at CONUS prior to a deployment to LOGCAP.  They should be integrated with the LSU in CONUS on a full time basis.  The LSU should have some JMD slots with Acquisition Contract, DCMA, and finance specialists.

II. TRAINING AND DOCTRINE

H.

SHORT TITLE:  THE CONCEPT OF LOGCAP IS NOT GETTING TO THE HIGHER LEVELS.

ISSUE:  PEOPLE FROM THE HIGHER LEVELS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, CENTCOM AND OTHER AGENCIES HAVE NO CLUE ON WHAT LOGCAP DOES OR DOES NOT DO.

DISCUSSION:  PM LOGCAP doesn’t do a great job on informing DA & OSD on what LOGCAP is and does.  We were always getting questions from DA & OSD through the CFLLC C8 during the TO89 funding shortfalls on what it provides   Such as what is the living standard?  Why are the DFACs serving 4 meals a day?   Why are Soldiers getting steak and lobster and 6 types of ice cream?  Why are Soldiers living better than they would in the states? What was PM LOGCAP been doing all these years?

Uneducated leaders at AMC that don’t know LOGCAP.   If AMC is the proponent for LOGCAP, how come some of the senior leadership is so clueless?  For example, AMC FSB Commanders, who kept insisting that they do not pay for LOGCAP, “because we are part of the Army and we provide support to the force.”

There should be a LOGCAP LSU LNO at the CENTCOM level to handle and pass info to them.  Why were we getting RFIs from CENTCOM when they could have gone straight to AMC?

PM LOGCAP acts as cheerleader for KBR and should cease engaging in this.  Even though the theater put out FRAGO 408 that ordered that LOGCAP is to be the last resort after a unit goes to other sources for their support.  You have General Casey, MNF-I Commander, ordering a 10% cut in LOGCAP.  When MNF-I did bottled water plant planning and decided against using LOGCAP and KBR, Don Trautner, on a VTC, was so upset with it, that he said, “Well, maybe they will come back to LOGCAP.”  Look at when Task Order 89 was initially going to be broken into 6 different task orders.  You had PM LOGCAP leading the charge in being so proactive in supporting this boondoggle idea and not staffing it through the MNC-I staff.  Thanks to MAJ Pathakis, LOGCAP Operations Officer, this madness was stopped.

RECOMMENDATION:  Have more visibility at the higher levels and inform these people on the capabilities of LOGCAP. 

III. MOBILIZATION AND UTILIZATION

A.

SHORT TITLE: LSU MOBILIZATION AND ROTATION

ISSUE:  INCREMENTAL MOBILIZATION AND ROTATION OF LSU PERSONNEL INTO THEATER

DISCUSSION:  An incremental mobilization and rotation of personnel into theater versus a complete switch-out of LSU personnel would provide better continuity of LOGCAP information and operations. Also, need to have staggered rotation, not whole unit transition, this doesn’t mean bringing in the replacements early then the prior group leaving early.

RECOMMENDATION:  Recommend an incremental mobilization and deployment of future LSU elements and rotating in no more than 3-4 personnel per month.

III. MOBILIZATION AND UTILIZATION

B.

SHORT TITLE: MOBILIZATION OF THE LSU RESERVE UNIT

ISSUE:  MOBILIZE THE LSU RESERVE UNIT

DISCUSSION:  This LSU Detachment consisted of mostly cross leveled Soldiers.  Yet when you analyze previous deployment orders there were 56 LSU drilling reservists that had not spent the total 2 years on active duty. With some planning and insight the LSU could have rotated the reserve unit through the AOR and not had to cross level other reservists. This cross leveling resulted in training, morale, and support problems. For example, during mobilization nearly a week was wasted with passes that the cross-leveled people could not take advantage of. Training was conducted that the Reserve Unit performs and would not have had to be done if it was a LSU member.

RECOMMENDATION:  AMC IG investigates the LSU over requests for cross leveling and mobilization in general. And provide recommendations for restructuring the mobilization and organization of the LSU to the offices of AMC and perhaps Army leadership.

III. MOBILIZATION AND UTILIZATION

C.

SHORT TITLE: NO PERSONNEL REPLACEMENT SYSTEM IN PLACE.

ISSUE:  THERE IS NO REAL WORKABLE PERSONNEL REPLACEMENT SYSTEM IN PLACE TO REPLACE INJURED OR INCOMPETENT LOGCAP PLANNERS.

DISCUSSION:  No contingency plans for replacing planners if KIA/WIA, medical, or not performing to standard.  It took two months to generate a replacement for a LTC when he could not get validated for deployment at Ft. Dix.  No options of replacing people were available.  Nobody from the LOGCAP Support Unit (LSU) in CONUS could be made available.  We have been lucky, so far, that nobody was seriously wounded or killed.  I kept wondering how replacements would have been made available to continue the mission.  We were able to shift a planner from Kuwait when a planner was medically evacuated from Iraq.  If LOGCAP was so highly visible on the AMC plate, then how come I could not replace people?  If it does replace people, LOGCAP was known in the past to shift people that did not perform or had a bad reputation, around to other theaters.  But it doesn’t work, because their reputation follows them and the word gets out.  It is embarrassing when you have KBR point out to you, “hey, I remember so and so from that previous operation, and he was a dud.  Why is he here?”  Currently, we are going through the same problem again on finding or shifting an officer to replace someone that was found to be non-deployable, but now has deployed to see if she can function if her living conditions are changed.  The SRP process needs to be revamped so that people can be identified in the beginning that are not deployable and not before they get on a plane.

RECOMMENDATION:  The LSU should have a pool of ready to deploy personnel to replace planners in theater, if need be, in the least amount of time so that the mission would not be impacted. If this officer that deployed does not work out, then the LSU will go through again what we went through when we had a planner that was medically evacuated. The USAR needs to improve identifying Soldiers as early as possible if they are not deployable before they get to a mobilization station.

III. MOBILIZATION AND UTILIZATION

D.

SHORT TITLE:  LSU RELYING ON CROSSLEVELED SOLDIERS

ISSUE:  THE LSU SHOULD BE TAKING A PROACTIVE APPROACH IN GROWING A NEW CROP OF LOGCAP PLANNERS FOR THE NEXT FIVE YEARS WORTH OF ROTATIONS

DISCUSSION:  The LOGCAP Support Unit is relying on crossleveled Soldiers that do not have a solid LOGCP experience to conduct their missions while protecting their own from mobilization to a real war zone and relying on cross leveled personnel with no previous LOGCAP experience to perform missions. When you look at the orders awarding medals for former LSU Soldiers, you will notice that the majority of them did not do a full year in theater.  Why does PM LOGCAP need so many officers from the LSU?  These officers could be better used on deployment.  These LSU unit members are trained in LOGCAP on a year round basis.  If LOGCAP is so high profile, why are they not double slotting people ahead of the next rotation?   Using their own personnel for “safe” and short missions to Georgia and Philippines.  Why LOGCAP in those places and not direct contracting?  Another reason that LOGCAP uses to protect its mission.  Why were AMC active duty officers, in non LOGCAP missions, only doing 4-6 month rotations and USAR officers were stuck with one year deployments?

RECOMMENDATION:  Start identifying Soldiers ahead of time for rotations.  Switch to a shorter rotation schedule.  3-4 month rotations work out a lot better than a year.  After a year on deployment, nerves start to fray.  There are more chances for fist to face meetings when situations get out of hand.  Attention to detail starts to degrade and you have incidents like SIPR violations.  Enforce the 2 year limit on the rest of the Soldiers of the LSU that are left.  Take them out of PM LOGCAP and hire some GS-7 to take their job.  Augment the LSU with double slotted Planner positions that will deploy.  These slots can be either paid or points only.  There are 11 USAR Reinforcement Training Units (RTU) in the Ft. Belvoir and Washington D.C. that have USAR officers in the system that are willing to drill for points.  This would be a useful source of personnel to tap into to fill out the LSU personnel needs for the future.  Use retirees that are willing to be recalled to fill deploying planner slots.   There were a lot of us that would had preferred to deploy with a “real” unit to a war zone and used the skills that we had trained for over the past decades to use.